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This paper shifts the focus of production, operations and supply chain management business relationships from the
vertical to the horizontal side and calls for more research on this issue. The main intent is to provide managerially
oriented arguments regarding the linkages between the achievement of operations-related goals and decisions related to
horizontal business relationships. Speciﬁcally, we address the following research question: Does a linkage exist between
production and operations objectives and the decisions a company makes about horizontal agreements, particularly hori-
zontal governance mode choice? To answer this research question, we develop literature-based hypotheses and collect
data from 4316 agreements of mergers and acquisitions and alliances and joint venture announced and completed
between 2000 and 2010 by 88 of the ﬁrst 100-ranked members of the Fortune 500 in the year 2000. We then test the
hypotheses through a binary logistic regression model. This study brings interesting results and ﬁndings in terms of how
and why production management considerations should play a crucial role in the type of strategic decisions that are usu-
ally reserved for ﬁnance and strategy managers. Operations managers should be fully involved in such decisions if they
are to be well acquainted about how their choices impact on operational objectives.
Keywords: horizontal relationships; operations performance; governance choice; mergers and acquisitions; alliances and
joint ventures
1. Introduction
Every ﬁrm (referred to as the focal ﬁrm) is embedded in a network of business relationships that allow it to carry out
its business activities. These relationships can be classiﬁed into two classes. On the one hand, there are vertical relation-
ships, which include ﬁrms that operate in different market levels, and that either sell to (i.e. suppliers) or buy from
(i.e. buyers) the focal ﬁrm. From a business agreement point of view, vertical relationships are basically the sourcing or
outsourcing of contracts, but may also include alliances and joint ventures (A&JVs) with suppliers or buyers. On the
other hand, there are the horizontal relationships, which include relationships with ﬁrms that operate at the same market
level and produce products/services that are either substitutable (i.e. competitors) or complementary (i.e. complementors)
to those produced by the focal ﬁrm. From a business agreement point of view, horizontal relationships are basically
A&JV, but also mergers and acquisitions (M&A) of competitors or complementors.
Figure 1 shows the focal ﬁrm network context and captures the difference between horizontal and vertical relationships.
The majority of studies into business networking production and operations management investigate strategic deci-
sions concerning the vertical dimension of a ﬁrm’s relationships (i.e. buyer–supplier relationships). For example, Nordin
(2008) individualises three main kinds of decisions regarding sourcing: make-or-buy decisions; supply-base structure;
and the nature of the buyer–seller relationship. He argues that these decisions actually play a strategic role in achieving
competitive advantage because they help in the pursuit of the ﬁrm’s business strategy. Many studies exist in the produc-
tion and operations management literature regarding each of these groups of decisions.
First, the ‘make-or-buy’ issues mainly relate to the choice between whether to outsource a speciﬁc business activity
or not, as well as the drivers that lead to this decision such as a ﬁrm’s distinctive capabilities, opportunism risk and so
on. For example, Cánez, Platts, and Probert (2000) built a make-or-buy framework to address the make-or-buy decisions
for either a speciﬁc mechanical component or a family of components.
Second, studies on ‘supply-base structure’ decisions basically concern the supplier selection, the number of suppliers
in the supply base and the interrelationships among them. The supplier selection is one of the most discussed topics
within such a topic, with multiple research approaches proposed in the production research literature to face such issue.
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Some studies provide a portfolio approach for supplier selection depending on the characteristics of the products/pro-
cesses to be outsourced (Şen et al. 2008; Wu et al. 2013). Other studies adopt multidimensional and fuzzy decision-
making approaches to tackle the multiple criteria and inherent uncertainty in supplier selection (Chen and Hung 2010;
Lin 2012). Econometric models are also adopted in order to assess the relative impact of cost, ﬂexibility, delivery and
quality features on the supplier selection process (van der Rhee, Verma, and Plaschka 2009). Also, recent studies have
focused on supply partner selection in agile supply chains by adopting a dynamic feedback model (e.g. Wu and Barnes
2012). Other research into this topic regards the number of suppliers in the supply base and the interrelationships among
them (Choi and Krause 2006). Regarding the number of suppliers, many studies examine conditions under which a
multiple-sourcing approach performs better than a single-sourcing approach on supply chain performance (Glock and
Ries 2013; Gosling, Purvis, and Naim 2010; Li and Amini 2012). Also, by extending studies regarding buyer–supplier
relationship management, production research has recently shown interest in investigating how the buying company
manages relationships between suppliers in its supply base (Gimenez, van der Vaart, and van Donk 2012). Other studies
propose a different typology of the supplier–supplier relationships, seeing it as a unique conﬁguration of the relational
characteristics and exploring the respective managerial implications (Choi et al. 2002; Wu and Choi 2005).
Thirdly, studies related to the ‘nature of buyer–supplier relationships’ mainly regard the empirical analysis of the
characteristics of the relationship in a continuum from transactional to relational buyer–supplier adaptation. Many stud-
ies investigate the impact of different relationship characteristics on buyer and/or supplier performance. Among these,
there are studies focused on the role played by cooperation and collaboration (Howard and Squire 2007; Huang et al.
2012; Li et al. 2007, 2013; Sharafali and Co 2000; Vachon, Halley, and Beaulieu 2009); communication (Paulraj, Lado,
and Chen 2008; Vanpoucke and Vereecke 2010); asset speciﬁcity (Abd. Rahman, Bennett, and Sohal 2009); knowledge
management processes and practices (Li, Tarafdar, and Rao 2012; Yang 2013); stability (Lai, Cheng, and Yeung 2005);
trust and fairness (Ebrahim-Khanjari, Hopp, and Iravani 2012; Ha, Park, and Cho 2011; Liu et al. 2012) and
commitment (Saghiri and Hill 2013).
Also, most of these studies into production management research investigate the impact of vertical networking deci-
sions on the buyer and supplier’s competitive advantage in terms of ﬁnancial, commercial and operational performance.
For example, Jiang, Belohlav, and Young (2007) investigated the relationship between ﬁrms’ market valuation and out-
sourcing decisions; González-Benito (2010) analysed the effect of purchasing and supply strategies on commercial and
ﬁnancial performance; Rosenzweig, Roth, and Dean (2003) provided empirical evidence that supply chain integration
intensity leads directly to improved business performance; and Wu et al. (2005) presented different outsourcing
approaches in relation to the long-term performance of an enterprise. Other studies investigate how different buyer–sup-
plier relationship management practices impact the operations performance of either the buyer (Krause, Handﬁeld, and
Tyler 2007; Prajogo et al. 2012; Wagner 2011) or the supplier (Oosterhuis, van der Vaart, and Molleman 2011).
Thus, while the production and operations management literature has dealt with studies about strategic decisions on
vertical relationships and their impact on performance, very few studies deal with horizontal relationships (Riccobono,
Bruccoleri, and Perrone 2013). Therefore, we wonder whether horizontal relationships really matter to production and
operational managers, and in this paper, we try to answer this question. Speciﬁcally, we argue and empirically test
Figure 1. Horizontal relationships and operations performance.
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whether horizontal relationships – like A&JVs with competitors and/or complementors, but also M&A – might have a
signiﬁcant role in achieving production and operations objectives, and thus whether they matter to production and opera-
tional managers.
We highlight the existence of a gap in the production and supply chain management literature concerning the study
of horizontal agreements in terms of the role that they play in the achievement of production and operations perfor-
mance objectives. For example, the acquisition of a product-related ﬁrm can allow the focal ﬁrm to reduce both product
development time and manufacturing costs by exploiting both economy of scope and scale. In sum, the objective of this
study is to explore how horizontal agreements (A&JV and M&A) might allow a company to achieve production and
operations performance objectives. This kind of study might bring very interesting results and ﬁndings in terms of how
and why operational considerations should play a crucial role in the type of strategic decisions that are usually reserved
for ﬁnance and strategy functions. Signing an extraordinary joint venture with a long-term competitor, making acquisi-
tions, planning mergers, and buying and selling divisions are easily explained to and understood by boards, shareholders
and the media. They offer the prospect of nearly immediate gratiﬁcation, and are consistent with the modern image of
the executive as someone who focuses on a grand strategy while leaving operational details to others, despite the fact
that operations are the source of sustained performance gain for many companies (Hammer 2004). On the contrary, pro-
duction and operations managers should be fully involved in such decisions if they are to be well acquainted with how
their choices impact on operational objectives.
In this paper, we focus on the production and operational reasons that underlay the choice between two different
kinds of horizontal governance agreements, namely M&A and A&JV. Speciﬁcally, we address the following research
question: Does a linkage exist between the pursued operations performance objectives and the choice between M&A
and A&JV horizontal agreements? As we already said, similar research questions have been addressed in production
and operations management literature in the realm of vertical relationships, yet none of these studies explore how such
objectives could be achieved through horizontal relationships with competitors and complementors.
We develop literature-based hypotheses and empirically test them using secondary data sources. Speciﬁcally, our
sample includes all of the M&A and A&JV announced and completed between 2000 and 2010 by 88 of the ﬁrst 100-
ranked members of the Fortune 500 in the year 2000. In total, we collected data from 4316 horizontal agreements. We
took the agreement as a unit of analysis and we tested our hypotheses using a binary logistic regression model.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the main theories inherited from operations and
strategic management literature about inter-ﬁrm relationships. Section 3 develops and states the hypotheses. Section 4
presents the research method, results and ﬁndings. Section 5 discusses the contribution and the implications of this paper.
2. Inter-ﬁrm relationships as sources of competitive advantage: a literature review
This section provides an overview of the most inﬂuential streams of literature about inter-ﬁrm networking, with speciﬁc
focus on network governance mechanism decisions. Speciﬁcally, we identify six prominent literature streams that pro-
vide different perspectives on the identiﬁcation of the main drivers for business relationships formation: transaction cost
economics (TCE); resource-based view (RBV); and relational, operational, co-opetition and institutional theory.
2.1 Transaction cost theory
The TCE theory, which was ﬁrst developed by Coase (1937) and then reﬁned by Williamson (1975), addresses the issue
about the existence and the boundary of the ﬁrm, and provides a framework for the identiﬁcation of the governance struc-
ture in the buyer–supplier relationship that minimises transaction costs and risk of opportunism. According to this frame-
work, a more hierarchy-oriented form of governance should be preferred over a market-oriented governance mode when
the asset speciﬁcity, the frequency of the transaction and the environmental uncertainty are high (Williamson 1975, 1985).
Speciﬁcally, three kinds of governance structures are identiﬁed in such a framework: the market, the hierarchy and the
hybrid. The market refers to arm’s length relationship with suppliers, and is the governance structure that minimises trans-
action costs when asset speciﬁcity and uncertainty are low. The hierarchy refers to the integration of the supplier in the
focal ﬁrm structure, and is a response to when asset speciﬁcity and uncertainty are high and transactions are frequent.
Finally, between these two extremes there are the hybrids, such as bilateral contracts and cooperative alliances. Such gov-
ernance structures should be adopted when uncertainty is low and asset speciﬁcity is medium or high.
2.2 Resource-based view
The RBV theory explains ﬁrms as bundles of resources (Penrose 1959). Such resources are considered a source of com-
petitive advantage in cases where they are valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable (VRIN) (Barney 1991, 1997).
International Journal of Production Research 3
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Resources consist of all the ﬁrm’s tangible or intangible assets and capabilities. Accordingly, inter-ﬁrm relationships can
generate VRIN resources by the synergies that are created when linking and pooling different companies’ resource
endowment. The RBV theory recommends choosing the governance mode that provides the best opportunity for sharing
and transferring resources. Also, the knowledge-based theory – an extension of the RBV – emphasises knowledge as
the ﬁrm’s most important distinctive resource (Conner and Prahalad 1996; Kogut and Zander 1992). From this perspec-
tive, more hierarchy-oriented governance modes are better suited when the level of knowledge to be shared is high.
2.3 Relational
The relational school emphasises the strategic role played by close and unique business relationships. The relational
school suggests that rather than transactional business relationships, relational can be a source of competitive advantage
because such kinds of relationships are rare and difﬁcult to imitate. The relational school initially underlined how a
ﬁrm’s relationships with customers can develop a sustained competitive advantage if organisations build strong, close
and positive relationships with them (Rowe and Barnes 1998). The focus of the relational school then moved to ﬁrm’s
relationships with suppliers, and suggests that external relationships with suppliers governed by an informal mechanism
(such as trust) can be a source of competitive advantage; this is known as ‘relational rent’. A relational rent is deﬁned
as a supernormal proﬁt jointly generated in an exchange relationship that cannot be generated by an isolated ﬁrm, but
only through the joint idiosyncratic contributions of the speciﬁc alliance partners (Dyer and Singh 1998). Speciﬁcally,
there are four sources of relational rent: (1) inter-ﬁrm speciﬁc assets; (2) inter-ﬁrm knowledge-sharing routines; (3) com-
plementary resource endowments and (4) effective governance. Also, informal self-enforcing safeguards are preferred
over formal third-party safeguards as the mechanisms to govern the relationships, since they ensure lower marginal cost
and the difﬁculty of imitation.
2.4 Operational
The operational school explains how vertical disintegration and modular production networks are the key governance
modes for responding to the competitive drivers of contemporary economies, including market globalisation, production
efﬁciency (especially in terms of costs), innovation (Sturgeon 2002) and responsiveness (Chopra and Meindl 2013).
Accordingly, the operational approach is more oriented toward an operations management point of view; that is, the
management of activities and resources required by an organisation to produce goods or services for customers (Slack
and Lewis 2002). Companies increase outsourcing and off-shoring practices to organise their production at a global level
and in an efﬁcient way (Zhang and Gregory 2011). In order to pursue such an operational strategy, organisations are
reducing their direct ownership of ‘non-core’ activities.
2.5 Co-opetition
The co-opetition approach recognises that competition nowadays is not among ﬁrms, but among ﬁrm networks; it thus
proposes the idea of the so-called ‘value-net’ that consists of the company, its suppliers and customers, competitors and
‘complementors’ (Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1998). These last players are able to make the ﬁrm’s products more com-
petitive, and can take the form of a company or set of companies who help the ﬁrm to build more value for the ﬁnal
customers. The added value is deﬁned as ‘the difference of the dimension of the cake when you are in the game com-
pared when you are not’ (Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1998), meaning that companies should look for partners who are
able to make bigger the whole cake.
2.6 Institutional
The institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) suggests that institutional environments should impose pressures
on organisations so as to appear legitimate and conform to prevailing social norms. In a business context, institutional
pressures motivate ﬁrms to pursue activities that will increase their legitimacy by appearing to be in agreement with the
prevailing social rules and norms of their business environments (Oliver 1990; Scott and Meyer 1983; Zucker 1977).
For example, small ﬁrms can increase their reputation, image and prestige through partnerships with larger and better-
established companies. Hence, from an institutional point of view, inter-ﬁrm relationships could allow ﬁrms to gain
competitive advantage by enhancing ﬁrm legitimacy and improving their status and image.
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3. Governance choices in horizontal relationships and operations performance: conceptual model and hypotheses
We adopt a contingency approach to develop our conceptual model (Figure 2). In fact, we developed our hypotheses
based on the contingent role of operations performance objectives within such a decision, i.e. based on considerations
about how speciﬁc horizontal relationships allow ﬁrms to achieve a better solution in terms of achieving operational
objectives (cost, quality, time and ﬂexibility). Thanks to this approach, we are able to understand real contingent
decisions, i.e. decisions that not only are inﬂuenced by the speciﬁc context, but that represent the best decision for
operations performance in that context.
We derive the drivers that lead to the choice of M&A and A&JV by relying on the theories presented in the previous
section. We individualise three different categories of drivers according to the theories that may affect the ﬁrm governance
mode choice. The ﬁrst category relates to the internal factors: this refers to a ﬁrm’s characteristics, such as its resources
and capabilities (R&C) endowment (White 2000). The second category relates to the transactional factors: these are
transactional characteristics, such as speciﬁcity of transaction-related investments and transaction cost (Hoffmann and
Schaper-Rinkel 2002). Finally, the third category relates to external factors: these are environmental characteristics, such
as industry competitiveness and environmental uncertainty (Geyskens, Steenkamp, and Kumar 2006).
Accordingly, we operationalise and individualise speciﬁc variables belonging to the internal, transactional and
external categories of factors that affect the choice between M&A and A&JV, and develop hypotheses on these vari-
ables based on the pursued operations objectives as it is described in the next section. Figure 2 summarises the resulting
conceptual framework and the relative hypotheses.
3.1 Firm’s internal R&C for the business activity (internal factor)
The TCE theory suggests that governance mode choices should be driven by an intention to minimise transaction costs
(i.e. the sum of coordination, monitoring and opportunism risk). In the context of horizontal relationships, the higher the
level of relatedness between the R&C owned by the ﬁrm and the R&C needed to carry out the business activity/s
involved in the transaction, the higher the risk of knowledge-appropriation and opportunism risk (since partners operate
in the same market), and thus the higher the transaction costs. In this situation, M&A can be considered as a way in
which to reduce these transaction costs by avoiding competition among partners, and thus allowing them to share their
similar knowledge-base. Conversely, low levels of relatedness decrease the risk of knowledge-appropriation and the
related opportunism risk. Accordingly, A&JV should be adopted to reduce the transaction costs associated with the
acquisition of a target ﬁrm.
Figure 2. Conceptual model.
International Journal of Production Research 5
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On the other hand, the RBV considers ﬁrms as a bundle of resources, and relates strategic decisions to resources
accordingly (e.g. Lewis et al. 2010) rather than being based on cost considerations. Horizontal relationships allow the
focal ﬁrm to pool its R&C endowment with those of other ﬁrms. When the focal ﬁrm has high levels of R&C needed
to carry out the business activity/s involved in the transaction, M&A can be used to exploit the long-term beneﬁts of
economies of scale and scope by pooling the same kinds of very similar resources to carry out speciﬁc business activi-
ties. Also, such economies allow the acquirer to sink the high level of capital requested by these kinds of deals and thus
reduce the cost of the investment. Conversely, when the focal ﬁrm’s levels of R&C needed to fulﬁl the transaction busi-
ness activity is low, A&JV can provide the ﬁrm with the requested R&C sooner and at a lower cost than M&A can.
Thus, when considering cost- and time-driven objectives, the level of relatedness between the R&C owned by the
ﬁrm and the R&C necessary to carry out the business activity/s involved in the transaction has to be taken into consider-
ation when choosing the governance mode in horizontal relationships. If the level is very high – meaning that the com-
pany fully owns the necessary R&C to carry out the business activity (which is the object of the transaction) – then it’s
convenient for the focal ﬁrm to adopt a more hierarchy-oriented governance mode in order to exploit economies of scale
and scope beneﬁts, achieve costs-related beneﬁts and reduce associated transaction costs. On the other hand, if the level
of R&C is low, then it’s more convenient to adopt a spot governance mode in order to ascertain beneﬁts in terms of cost
and time-based performance by acquiring R&C that the ﬁrm does not own, but that are requested for the fulﬁlment of
the speciﬁc business activity. Hence, the following statement has been hypothesised:
Hypothesis 1: The higher the ﬁrm’s internal R&C to carry out the business activity (which is the object of the transaction), the
higher the likelihood that the ﬁrm will choose M&A over A&JV.
3.2 Business activity type (transactional factor)
The knowledge-based view considers knowledge as the ﬁrm’s most important distinctive resource (Conner and Prahalad
1996). The relational school suggests that inter-ﬁrm knowledge-sharing routines (among others) are a source of competi-
tive advantage (Nagati and Rebolledo 2012). Since innovation primarily requires new synergies of R&C, a constant inﬂow
of knowledge from external sources is required to create a productive research and development (R&D) environment
(Fey and Birkinshaw 2005). In vertical relationships, because of the high level of tacit knowledge frequently involved in
technological capabilities, A&JV have been shown to have advantages over conventional contracts or markets for the fulf-
ilment of R&D business activities, since they allow higher knowledge transferability (Fey and Birkinshaw 2005). The
formation of A&JV with suppliers for R&D activities has been a continuous trend in technology-intensive industries
(e.g. semiconductors and ICT) since 1975. Such a trend has been motivated by higher levels of knowledge and technology
transfer among participants (Mowery, Oxley, and Silverman 1996). The production and operations literature provide evi-
dence that cost, time to market and ﬂexibility related to R&D activities jointly conducted by buyer and supplier can be
reduced when people use, share and create knowledge (Danese and Filippini 2010; Stevenson and Spring 2009).
When considering horizontal relationships, transaction costs considerations lead to different implications about the
most appropriate governance mode to choose when the activities involved in the transaction are high knowledge-intensive
activities (i.e. R&D activities), since after the fulﬁlment of the R&D activities, the partners still remain competitors in the
market. Accordingly, horizontal relationships could obstruct the ﬂuid transfer of knowledge, reduce the potentiality of
knowledge as a source of competitive advantage and increase the transaction costs of partner coordination and monitor-
ing, because the opportunism risk associated with knowledge-appropriation is higher. In this situation, M&A can overlap
with the above problems by avoiding the post-deal competition, while exploiting the potentiality of inter-ﬁrm knowledge-
sharing routines as a source of competitive advantage in terms of reducing time to market for new product development.
The acquisition of biotechnology ﬁrms by pharmaceutical companies provides a good example in this sense.
On the other hand, when the transaction business activities are less knowledge-intensive (e.g. manufacturing and
marketing), the operational school suggests that modular production networks are the key governance modes for enhanc-
ing production efﬁciency (especially in terms of costs), ﬂexibility, innovation and responsiveness. Accordingly, less hier-
archy-oriented agreements with complementors should be preferred over more hierarchy-oriented ones when the
transaction activities are related to less knowledge-intensive and more operations-intensive activities.
Summing up, cost-, time- and ﬂexibility-based considerations lead us to associate manufacturing and marketing
activities with A&JV, while knowledge-based R&D activities are associated with M&A. Accordingly, the following
hypothesis has been stated:
Hypothesis 2: The more knowledge-intensive the business activity (which is the object of the transaction), the higher the
likelihood the ﬁrm will choose M&A over A&JV.
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3.3 Complementary ﬁrms (external factor)
We refer to complementary ﬁrms as companies of the same industry (incumbents or new entrants) with capabilities that
are different yet mutually supportive (Hitt, Harrison, and Ireland 2001; Luo 2002). According to the co-opetition
approach, ‘complementors’ (Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1998) are able to make the products of the focal ﬁrm more
competitive by enabling it to build more value for the ﬁnal customers. If we also adopt a relational perspective (that is
usually considered for relationships with customers and suppliers) for analysing relationships with ‘complementors’, we
must say that building unique relationships with this kind of partner should allow the focal ﬁrm the potential to
strengthen their competitive advantage creation in its industry. Accordingly, horizontal relationships with complementary
ﬁrms (i.e. complementors) allow the focal ﬁrm to enhance its competitive position. Despite this, the co-opetition
approach, combined with the relational perspective, does not provide insight into the most appropriate horizontal gover-
nance mode to adopt. The operational school suggests that the ‘vertical disintegration’ (Stigler 1951), and the conse-
quent emergence of intermediate markets, is mainly driven by the willingness of ﬁrms to gain advantages from the trade
of specialised production. In this context, market-oriented vertical business relationships for capital-intensive production
activities at specialised ﬁrms enhance their ability to respond ﬂexibly to changes in technology or demand reductions in
product development cycle times (e.g. Harrigan 1983). In a similar way, when the focal ﬁrm operates in an industry
with a high number of complementary ﬁrms, adopting multiple horizontal agreements with complementors can enhance
its ability to exploit such relationships more ﬂexibly, and to enhance their added value for the ﬁnal customer in a shorter
time. Accordingly, in a context characterised by high number of complementary ﬁrms, A&JV horizontal relationships
should be preferred over M&A. On the other hand, when the number of complementary ﬁrms is low, M&A can allow
the focal ﬁrm to achieve an advantage by exploiting the value created by horizontal relationships with complementors
while drastically reducing the transaction cost due to the monopoly/oligopoly position of the few complementary ﬁrms
that operate in the industry. These arguments suggest the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3a: The higher the number of complementary ﬁrms in the focal ﬁrm industry, the higher the likelihood the ﬁrm will
choose A&JV over M&A.
3.4 Governance mode trend (external factor)
The cognitive domain refers to the shared beliefs and values that lead the actors of a given organisation or societal entity
to interpret and motivate speciﬁc context in a certain way. Such a domain is considered as the ‘internalised symbolic rep-
resentations of the world’ (Scott 1995). Consequently, the institutional theory suggests that ﬁrms’ decision-makers are
unaware of the full range of known alternatives (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Greenwood and Hinings 1996), and only
consider the options with high levels of cognitive legitimacy. Regarding the adoption of speciﬁc governance modes rather
than the cognitive domain suggests that ﬁrms that belong to a particular industry will tend to imitate the governance mode
choice adopted by the majority of ﬁrms in the industry. Also, from an operations perspective, the adoption of M&A by
the majority of ﬁrms in the same industry allows them to reduce operating costs by exploiting the beneﬁts of economy of
scale and scope. Hence, if the majority of ﬁrms strongly reduce costs by adopting such a governance mode, it could be
necessary for the others ﬁrms to adopt it in order to survive. On the other hand, for ﬁrms that operate in industries where
the propensity is to adopt A&JV, it is likely that the routinisation of such a practice would allow them to take advantage
of such collaborations while exploiting the related ﬂexibility advantage and reducing the transaction costs and timings
due to the habit in adopting this kind of governance mode. Accordingly, the following hypothesis has been stated:
Hypothesis 3b: The higher the M&A governance mode trend in the focal ﬁrm industry, the higher the likelihood the ﬁrm will
choose M&A over A&JV.
4. Research method
The research method adopted to test the theory-based hypotheses consists of a secondary data set analysis. Secondary
data analysis consists of analysing data collected by someone else (not speciﬁcally for the research questions at hand)
and using the data to get a better understanding of a theoretical concept (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 1992;
Stewart 1984). Different sources are generally used to collect such types of data (e.g. annual reports and organisational
statistics, industry statistics provided by government agencies, etc.).
We collected the information we needed from the Security Data Company (SDC) Platinum and from ORBIS.
SDC (http://thomsonreuters.com/sdc-platinum) is a multi-sector database that collects a very wide range of agree-
ments typologies from 1990 to 2005. Speciﬁcally, SDC provides two data-sets of business deals: those regarding M&A
International Journal of Production Research 7
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agreements and another regarding A&JV. The information provided includes the name, the standard industry
classiﬁcation (SIC) code, the nationality of the participants and the terms of the deal.
ORBIS (http://www.bvdinfo.com/en-gb/products/company-information/international/orbis) is a global company
database that provides private company ﬁnancial information (depending on the country in which the company is
located). ORBIS also allows the user to get extensive data about a company, including locations of subsidiaries; screens
for companies based on geography, ﬁnancial performance, industry, deals, ownership structure, number of employees,
year of incorporation and other criteria; and compares a company to its competitors along multiple dimensions. The spe-
ciﬁc information that we got from the above-mentioned databases is described in the following sections.
In the following section, we present the measures we used to operationalise the conceptual model variables
(Section 4.1), the data collection (Section 4.2) and the analysis of the data by applying a logistic regression and results
(Section 4.3).
4.1 Variables’ operationalisation
The ﬁrst stage of the empirical research consists of deﬁning the measures of the variables that emerged in the
hypotheses. Starting with Hypothesis 1, the ﬁrst variable to be measured is the level of a ﬁrm’s internal R&C for the
business activity. This variable refers to the contribution of the focal ﬁrm’s R&C to the ones requested for the delivery
of the business activities involved in the transaction. We assume that the higher the similarity between the SIC codes of
the company and the business activity, the higher the likelihood that the ﬁrm owns internal R&C for conducting that
business activity. Many other papers have already used the proximity in the SIC codes of the focal ﬁrm and the deal (or
target ﬁrm) as a measure of relatedness between the focal ﬁrm and the deal itself (e.g. Villalonga and McGahan 2005).
Speciﬁcally, we measure this variable as the ratio between the R&C that the focal ﬁrm already owns to carry out the
business activities involved in the transaction, and the overall R&C requested to carry out these activities. Thus, its
value is one if the focal ﬁrm owns all the R&C requested by the business activities involved in the transaction; zero if
it does not own any of the R&C requested; and a percentage value between the two in the other cases. For the measure
of this variable, we collected information in SDC about the SIC code of the ‘participants’ and the SIC code of the ‘deal’
when the deal regards an alliance or joint venture, as well as information about the SIC codes of the ‘acquirer’ and of
the ‘target’ when the deal is a merger or acquisition.
The variable involved in Hypothesis 2 regards the business activity type. This variable individualises two main
activity categories: the R&D activities and the manufacturing and marketing (M&M) activities. Speciﬁcally, it takes the
value two if the deal regards R&D activities, and one if it concerns M&M activities. The higher value considered for
the R&D activities signals the higher level of tacit knowledge frequently involved in these kinds of activities. Informa-
tion about the activity type was found in SDC.
Regarding the complementary ﬁrms (Hypothesis 3a), this variable refers to the number of ﬁrms that belongs to the
same ‘major group’ of the SIC as the focal ﬁrm, but which operate in different SIC ‘industry groups’. For example, let’s
suppose that the focal ﬁrm belongs to the SIC major group transportation equipment, and speciﬁcally to the SIC indus-
try group motor vehicles and motor vehicles equipment. In this case, the complementary ﬁrms are those that belong to
the SIC major group transportation equipment, but which do not operate in the SIC industry group motor vehicles and
motor vehicles equipment. We collected information about focal ﬁrms’ SIC codes in SDC, and about the number of
complementary ﬁrms in ORBIS. Finally, the governance mode trend variable (Hypothesis 3b) refers to the trend of the
industry (i.e. companies that have exactly the same SIC code) towards adopting a more hierarchy-oriented governance
mode (e.g. there are more M&A than A&JV). This is a dummy variable that takes the value 2 if the number of M&A
is bigger than A&JV, and 1 otherwise. This information has been collected by screening in SDC for M&A and A&JV
deals that were undertaken between 2000 and 2010 by ﬁrms that belong to the same SIC code of the focal ﬁrm.
The dependent variable – the governance mode – takes the value 1 if the deal of the focal ﬁrm is a merger or an
acquisition, and 0 if it is an alliance or a joint venture. We control for the focal ﬁrm size effect that we measured as the
ﬁrm proﬁt in 2000. We took such a value from the CNN Money Website. Table 1 presents each variable, the way it is
measured, the hypothesis it is related to, its predicted sign and the data source.
4.2 Data collection and descriptive statistics
The second stage of the empirical research consists of collecting information used to measure the variables. First, we
selected those who engaged in at least one of the two kinds of deals considered (M&A or A&JV) between the years
2000 and 2010 from among the ﬁrst 100-ranked members of the Fortune 500 in the year 2000. The ﬁnal sample was
composed of 88 of the ﬁrst 100-ranked members. Second, we collected all the information requested to measure the
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variables from SDC and ORBIS. Finally, we took each deal as a unit of analysis and built the data-set by transforming
the raw data collected into the variable measures previously deﬁned. The ﬁnal data-set includes 4316 observations com-
ing from all of the M&A and A&JV announced and completed between 2000 and 2010 by 88 of the ﬁrst 100-ranked
members of the Fortune 500 in the year 2000.
Table 2 indicates that 2926 of the deals in the sample (68%) are M&A and 1390 (32%) are A&JV. The ﬁrms in the
sample engaged in an average of 49 deals, 33 of which were M&A and 15 of which were A&JV. Table 3 lists the num-
ber of M&A and A&JV for each ﬁrm in the sample period (2000–2010). Some ﬁrms used mixed governance strategies,
while others specialised in one particular governance form. Citigroup had the most acquisitions (330). Microsoft had the
most alliances (210). Finally, Citigroup pursued more total deals than any other ﬁrm (347). TIAA-CREF, Chevron
Texaco and FleetBoston Financial pursued fewer deals than any other ﬁrm (1). Table 4 shows the distribution of deals
by focal ﬁrm sector (where the sector refers to the industry division as classiﬁed by the Standard Industrial Classiﬁca-
tion). The most deals of all types are in manufacturing. The fewest deals occur in the mining sector.
Table 5 shows the number of values, and the minimum, maximum, average and standard deviation of each of the
variables involved in the ﬁnal data-set.
Finally, Table 6 reports the resulting correlation matrix of the data-set and shows that the variables of our model are
not correlated.
4.3 Data analysis, results and ﬁndings
All of our hypotheses predict a linear relationship between the independent variable and the level of hierarchy in the
governance mode. In fact, they suggest that higher values of the independent variable correspond to higher (or lower)
values of the dependent variable. We used binary logistic regression because the dependent variable, namely ‘gover-
nance mode’, takes two possible values (as mentioned before). Thus, a positive (negative) coefﬁcient on any of the inde-
pendent variables can be interpreted as relating to a higher (lower) probability that the ﬁrm will choose to adopt M&A
over A&JV. The results of the logistic analysis linking internal, transactional and external factors to the governance
mode choice are presented in Table 7.
The ﬁrm’s internal R&C for the business activity variable is signiﬁcantly and positively associated with the choice
of a more hierarchical governance mode, as predicted by Hypothesis 1. The higher the ﬁtting between the ﬁrm’s internal
resources’ endowment and the resources requested by the business activities involved in the transaction, the higher the
intent of the ﬁrm to share it strictly with other partners. From an operations performance perspective, M&A with prod-
uct-related ﬁrms allows costs reductions in terms of economies of scope and scale exploitation due to R&C sharing.
This result supports the knowledge-based theory that ﬁrms can gain beneﬁts by not only combining complementary
Table 1. Hypothesis variables – measures, expected sign and source of information.
Variable Measure Hypotheses Sign Source
Governance mode The variable takes the value 1 if the deal of the focal ﬁrm is a merger or
an acquisition; 0 if it is an alliance or a joint venture
1, 2, 3a,
3b
/ SDC
Firm’s internal R&C for
the business activity
Proximity in the SIC codes of the focal ﬁrm and the business activities
involved in the transaction. In case of M&A, the measure is the ratio of
the number of focal ﬁrms’ SIC codes that are equal to the target ﬁrms and
the number of all the SIC codes of the target ﬁrms. In case of JV&A, the
measure is the ratio of the number of focal ﬁrms’ SIC codes that are equal
to those of the deal and the number of all the SIC codes of the deal
1 + SDC
Business activity type The variable takes the value 2 if the activities of the target ﬁrm (in M&A)
and of the deal (in A&JV) regard research and development; and 1 if they
concern manufacturing and marketing
2 + SDC
Complementary ﬁrms The measure is the ratio of the number of ﬁrms that have the ﬁrst two
digits of their primary SIC code equal to the focal ﬁrm ones, but where the
last two are different to the number of ﬁrms that have the ﬁrst two digits
of their primary SIC code equal to the focal ﬁrms’
3a − SDC;
ORBIS
Governance mode trend The variable takes the value 2 if the number of mergers and acquisitions is
bigger than the alliances and joint venture; 1 otherwise
3b + SDC
Firm size The focal ﬁrm proﬁt value / / CNN
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knowledge, but also by pooling their expertise in the same area of knowledge. On the other hand, A&JV at non-prod-
uct-related ﬁrms allow both cost and time reduction as a result of the possibility of using other companies’ R&C.
The business activity type variable is signiﬁcantly and positively associated with the choice of a more hierarchical
governance mode, as predicted by Hypothesis 2. High knowledge-based business activities are carried out by M&A
instead of A&JV. From an operations performance perspective, M&A initiated for R&D activities allow ﬁrms to mini-
mise coordination costs and opportunism risk, and reduce time to market by exploiting the beneﬁts of strict relational
bonds between cooperating and non-competing entities. On the other hand, A&JV initiated for M&M allow ﬁrms to
enhance their production efﬁciency in terms of costs, ﬂexibility, responsiveness and exploiting advantages of distributed
production and decentralised marketing. Also, as argued by Danese and Filippini (2010) and Stevenson and Spring
(2009), less hierarchical governance modes for manufacturing activities allows companies to change their products/
services at shorter notice and a lower cost.
The complementary ﬁrms variable is statistically non-signiﬁcant in our logistic model. Thus, Hypothesis 3a is not
supported in our analysis. On the contrary, the governance mode trend is signiﬁcantly and positively associated with the
choice of a more hierarchical governance mode, as predicted by Hypothesis 3b. The governance mode trend of adopting
M&A in the industry means ﬁrms are more likely to adopt M&A instead of A&JV. This result supports the institutional
theory, according to which organisations adopt structures and practices that are ‘isomorphic’ to those of the other organ-
isations in the same industry (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Greenwood and Hinings 1996). From an operations perfor-
mance perspective, in industries where there are a lot of M&A, it is easier to achieve cost reduction due to the
exploitation of economies of scope and scale already developed by other companies. Furthermore, companies in such
industries are more likely to adopt the same governance mode than all the other companies in the market in order to
maintain similar company size. Similarly, in industries in which A&JV are frequently implemented, ﬁrms continue with
such governance modes for future collaborations because the routinisation of such a practice brings about reductions in
transaction costs and timing.
Finally, the ﬁrm size is signiﬁcantly and negatively associated with the choice of a more hierarchical governance
mode. In other words, the higher the ﬁrm size, the lower the probability that ﬁrms will choose M&A over A&JV. Such
a result could be justiﬁed by the higher inclination of smaller ﬁrms to adopt a growth strategy such as M&A.
5. Contribution, implications and conclusions
The main intent of this paper was to overcome the limitations of existing production, operations and supply chain man-
agement literature in providing managerially oriented arguments regarding the linkages between the achievement of
operations-related objectives and decisions related to horizontal business relationships. By relying on the main theories
about business-to-business relationships, and by examining 4316 M&A and A&JV deal announcements signed between
2000 and 2010 by the ﬁrst 100-ranked members of the Fortune 500 in the year 2000, this paper adopts an operations
objectives’ contingent approach to provide theoretical arguments and empirical evidence for existing linkages between
horizontal and hierarchy-oriented governance modes (M&A and A&JV) and production and operations performance.
This paper has both theoretical and managerial implications. The main theoretical implication for production, opera-
tions and supply chain management literature is represented by the shift of the research focus from the linkage between
operations performance and vertical relationships to the linkage between operations performance and horizontal relation-
ships. Speciﬁcally, this study opens up new frontiers for researchers wishing to extend their studies concerning supply
chain relationships with respect to the three main investigated issues – ‘make or buy’, ‘supply base’ and ‘nature of
buyer–supplier relationship’ – and their impact on operations performance. Firstly, by considering M&A and A&JV,
along with competitors and complementors, as a way to achieve speciﬁc operations performance objectives, this study
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of deals in the sample.
M&A A&JV All deals
Average 33.25 15.79 49.04
Median 14.5 7 28.5
Min. 0 0 1
Max. 330 210 347
Total no. of deals 2926 1390 4316
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Table 3. M&As, A&JVs and total number of deals for each of the 88 ﬁrms selected from the ﬁrst 100-ranked Fortune 500 in the
year 2000.
Focal ﬁrm name M&A A&JV All deals
Aetna 2 1 3
Allstate 4 2 6
Altria Group 42 0 42
American Express 27 36 63
American Intl. Group 0 2 2
AMR 1 3 4
Aquila 4 2 6
AT&T 66 39 105
AutoNation 8 0 8
Bank of America Corp. 75 20 95
Bank One Corp. 0 2 2
BellSouth 10 14 24
Berkshire Hathaway 128 1 129
Boeing 22 28 50
Bristol-Myers Squibb 9 33 42
Cardinal Health 34 11 45
Caterpillar 32 7 39
Chase Manhattan Corp. 0 7 7
ChevronTexaco 0 1 1
Cigna 15 0 15
Citigroup 330 17 347
Coca-Cola 120 15 135
Compaq Computer 16 32 48
ConAgra Foods 13 2 15
Conoco 21 6 27
Costco Wholesale 1 1 2
CVS 0 2 2
Dell 0 31 31
Dow Chemical 2 17 19
Duke Energy 28 10 38
DuPont 0 9 9
Electronic Data Systems 0 27 27
Enron 19 9 28
Exxon Mobil 21 11 32
FleetBoston Financial 0 1 1
Ford Motor 42 31 73
General Electric 196 20 216
General Motors 12 22 34
Georgia-Paciﬁc 11 2 13
Goldman Sachs Group 288 11 299
GTE 0 2 2
Hewlett-Packard 74 98 172
Home Depot 35 3 38
Honeywell Intl. 48 32 80
Ingram Micro 15 13 28
Intel 78 58 136
International Paper 32 4 36
Intl. Business Machines 148 3 151
J.P. Morgan 0 20 20
Johnson & Johnson 63 9 72
Kroger 12 1 13
Lehman Brothers Hldgs. 120 12 132
Lockheed Martin 31 35 66
Loews 14 0 14
Lucent Technologies 21 52 73
Marathon Oil 0 6 6
McKesson 0 14 14
Merck 17 60 77
(Continued)
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suggests extending the dimension ‘make or buy’ to ‘make/buy/make together’. Secondly, by considering not just vertical
partners (i.e. buyer and supplier), which is often examined in the production and operations literature, but also the hori-
zontal ones (competitors and complemetors), this study suggests extending the dimension ‘supply-base structure’ to
‘network-based structure’. Thirdly, by considering also the horizontal side of the focal ﬁrm network, this study suggests
extending the dimension ‘nature of buyer–supplier relationship’ predominantly investigated in the production and opera-
tions literature to the ‘nature of business relationships’.
Among the above-mentioned dimensions, the research presented in this paper extends the dimension ‘make or buy’
to ‘make/buy/make together’, and speciﬁcally considers the two options A&JV (make together) and M&A (make). We
Table 3. (Continued).
Focal ﬁrm name M&A A&JV All deals
Merrill Lynch 0 21 21
MetLife 31 4 35
Microsoft 110 210 320
Morgan Stanley 0 8 8
Motorola 1 83 84
New York Life Insurance 14 1 15
PepsiCo 24 7 31
Procter & Gamble 28 14 42
Prudential Financial 66 3 69
Raytheon 15 18 33
Safeway 12 0 12
Sara Lee 0 2 2
SBC Communications 0 7 7
Sears Roebuck 9 5 14
Sprint 5 7 12
State Farm Insurance Cos 0 2 2
Supervalu 4 0 4
Sysco 21 0 21
Target 0 4 4
Texaco 0 11 11
TIAA-CREF 0 1 1
Time Warner 0 29 29
United Technologies 126 5 131
UnitedHealth Group 35 3 38
Wachovia Corp. 0 5 5
Wal-Mart Stores 26 7 33
Walgreen 38 4 42
Walt Disney 39 0 39
Wells Fargo 0 8 8
Xerox 15 14 29
Table 4. Number of M&As, A&JV, and total number of deals by focal ﬁrm sector.
Sector (SIC division)
M&A A&JV All deals
Number
% of all
deals Number
% of all
deals Number
% of all
deals
Finance, insurance and real estate 1149 86 188 14 1337 100
Manufacturing 831 55 676 45 1507 100
Mining 40 60 27 40 67 100
Retail trade 145 84 27 16 172 100
Services 360 56 278 44 638 100
Transportation, communications, electric, gas and sanitary
services
331 68 156 32 487 100
Wholesale trade 70 65 38 35 108 100
All sectors 2926 68 1370 32 4316 100
12 F. Riccobono et al.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ita
 di
 Pa
ler
mo
] a
t 0
7:4
8 1
8 F
eb
ru
ary
 20
14
 
found empirical evidence that internal, transactional and external factors inﬂuence companies’ choices between these
two options because such contingent decisions become the best choice with respect to operations and production perfor-
mance objectives.
From a managerial perspective, production and operations managers should consider the following ﬁndings as guide-
lines for the achievement of operations performance objectives through the most appropriate horizontal agreement:
 Firms that own similar R&C endowment tend to work closely with each other through M&A (or otherwise
through A&JV). Production and operations managers should be aware that M&A are more suitable to achieve
cost-related performance through the exploitation of economies of scale and scope; however, A&JV should be
used to achieve time-based and cost-related beneﬁts through the easy access to R&C, which they lack.
 Firms that have to jointly carry out R&D activities generally adopt M&A; whereas, ﬁrms that have to jointly
carry out M&M activities are likely to adopt A&JV. Production and operations managers should consider that
M&A are more appropriate to reduce time to market through better implementation of knowledge-sharing rou-
tines; whereas, A&JV allow ﬁrms to increase ﬂexibility, innovation and responsiveness by exploiting the
dynamic nature of such agreement types.
 Firms that operate in industries characterised by a high adoption of M&A tend to adopt the same governance
mode. Production and operations managers should take into account that following the M&A trend would
beneﬁt cost-related performance, whereas following the A&JV trend would increase ﬂexibility, cost and time
advantages.
Table 5. Descriptive statistics of the model variables.
Variables N Minimum Maximum Mean Standard deviation Median Mode
Governance mode 4316 0.00 1.00 / / 1 1
Firm’s internal R&C for the business activity 4316 0.00 1.00 / / 0 0
Business activity type 4316 1.00 2.00 1.11 0.31009 1 1
Complementary ﬁrms 4316 0.00 1.00 0.88 0.14921 0.935 0.982
Governance mode trend 4316 1.00 2.00 / / 1 1
Firm size 4316 −935 10.717 4171.35 3360.14 2708 7785
Table 6. Correlation matrix.
1 2 3 4 5
1. Firm’s internal R&C 1
2. Business activity type 0.0553 1
3. Complementary ﬁrm 0.0050 0.0568 1
4. Governance mode trend −0.1198 −0.1342 −0.2124 1
5. Firm size 0.0273 0.0296 0.0861 −0.1561 1
Table 7. Logistic analysis of governance mode choice.
Variable Hypothesis Coefﬁcient Standard error
Firm’s internal R&C for the transaction activity 1 0.47*** 0.082673
Transaction activity type 2 0.35*** 0.1086695
Complementary ﬁrms 3a 0.02 0.2468328
Governance mode trend 3b 1.59*** 0.0745851
Firm size −0.00*** 0.000101
Log likelihood −2525.3679
No. of observations 4316
Prob. > χ2 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.1134
***p < 0.01.
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This study can be considered ‘exploratory’ because, as already mentioned, it is a starting point in the investigation
of how horizontal relationships allow ﬁrms to achieve speciﬁc operations performance objectives. We achieved this
result by extending the traditional decisional dimensions on vertical relationships into ‘extended’ dimensions of horizon-
tal relationships. However, we have only considered the ‘make/buy/make together’ dimension of horizontal business
relationships (M&A and A&JV) and their linkage with operations objectives. Therefore, further studies should investi-
gate other decision dimensions related to horizontal relationships (the ‘network-based structure’ and the ‘nature of busi-
ness relationships’) and their linkages to production and operations. This study lacks of a conﬁrmatory analysis that can
effectively investigate if managers actually adopt horizontal relationships and agreements to achieve operations perfor-
mance objectives and, speciﬁcally, which kind of agreement (i.e. M&A vs. A&JV) they actually adopt depending on the
speciﬁc operations performance objective that they wish to achieve. Unfortunately, the secondary-data analysis approach
did not allow us investigate these issues any deeper. Also, further research that considers the longitudinal impact of gov-
ernance mode choices on post-deal operation capabilities and performance would certainly provide more insights on the
actual effectiveness of governance mode decisions. For example, there is a broad literature that investigates the impact
of M&A managerial practices on deal success in terms of market and ﬁnancial performance (Cusatis and Blumberg
2009; Gill 2012; Martin and Combs 2009), but very few studies in terms of operations performance.
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